Welsh Journals

tions to be asked are whether they were unavoidable, whether, when they were discovered, steps were im- mediately taken to ensure that they would not be repeated, whether such of our politicians, our sailors, our soldiers and our bureaucratic heads of depart- ments as had proved themselves to be incompetent, were removed from their posts, or whether, as it is to be feared happened frequently, they were pro- moted to some new sphere of activity. Upon the efficient conduct of the war depends not only the victory of our cause, but also the lives and safety of millions of our brave countrymen. Tremendous issues are at stake; and there is no room for the interests or personal claims of individuals however highly they may be placed. In war, success is the only sound criterion of efficiency, rough and ready though it may be. It is the only test which can be applied to the leadership of a Statesman, to the adminis- tration of a Minister, to the operations of a General, or to the activities of a diplomatist. Judged by this standard, few of our chiefs have earned a title to the homage of a grateful country. The errors into which many of them have fallen have often been due to their inability to arrive at swift decisions. War is a game which brooks of no delay, and deci- sions have frequently to be taken on the spur of the moment. Procrastination is the blunder which is worse than a crime. It is the forerunner of disaster, and we have seen its evil effects exemplified over and over again during the last three years. Some- body has said that a good plan, slowly and badly executed, is worse than a bad plan executed with promptness and decision, but it appears to be an inherent weakness of some of our statesmen that they must always take protracted and elaborate soundings before they navigate the ship into the harbour of a definite decision. This process may be attended by minor evils in time of peace it may, in fact, be then necessary within certain limits but it is not conducive to success in war. Leaving this point, let us consider in more detail how far the test of efficiency has been applied to the services. First of all, let us take the case of the army. When the war broke out, this country possessed an army which for its size surpassed in purely military efficiency any other army in the world. Our Ex- peditionary Force was well-equipped, highly trained in manoeuvres in the field and in musketry, unsur- passed in discipline and in esprit-de-corps. In every- thing except numbers it was all that could be desired. It is true that the staff had had no opportunity of handling large bodies of troops in the field, that because of the nature of their training they found it difficult to adapt themselves to new methods of warfare, and that, partly owing to the traditions of English life, the army did not attract the vast majority of intellectual and educated young men, who pre- ferred to devote themselves to more lucrative, and what they regarded as more attractive, pro- fessions. But in a few short months the original Expeditionary Force practically ceased to exist. It was gradually replaced and supplemented by Terri- torial Units and divisions of the New Army. The war of manoeuvre became transformed into a war of positions. Both sides were tied down to their trenches, and success became more dependent upon the tenacity of the troops, upon new tactics, and most of all upon the development of machinery and organisation behind the contending lines. Promo- tion was rapid, brigadiers and colonels soon found themselves in command of divisions, corps, and armies. In the meantime, the conditions of warfare were also continually changing. Artillery and railways, trench mortars and motor transport, aeroplanes and tanks began to assume an importance which had never been dreamed of in pre-war days. There was a call for the abilities and training that had formerly been employed in the arts of peace, and the special knowledge of civilian engineers, manufac- turers, and business organisers generally became of primary value for the purposes of war. The most striking instance of the importance of these supplementary activities is to be found in the case of munitions. It was a civilian Minister who, in opposition to the view of the highest military autho- rities, demanded a huge increase in the output of high explosive shells, and built up the immense organisation which now supplies our armies with munitions. Another example is the case of the general manager of a British railway who became a Major-General, with complete control of all military transportation. Junior officers introduced the idea of tanks, and in many directions it became clear that staff-college training was not necessarily applicable, except in its general principles, to the new conditions of warfare. It also became clear that the older Generals and the staff generally, in so far as it was composed of officers who had had no regimental experience of trench warfare, found it difficult to adapt themselves to these new conditions. The regimental officers of the Expeditionary Force had vanished, but the staff still remained, and in many instances they failed to understand the feelings and esprit de corps which animated the new Army. Thus, it came about that the P.S.C. or Staff College officers, regular officers of the old Army, and officers of the