Welsh Journals

BEFORE the War, devolution was a favourite topic of discussion; much was written about it the merits of different proposals were keenly canvassed but no practical policy was ever enunciated. Mr. Churchill made his famous speech about the Heptarchy, and during the progress of the Home Rule Bill through the House of Commons the advocates of devolution all round made their voices heard. It may appear inopportune to raise this question at the present moment, at a time when all our energies are directed towards the winning of the War. But although at first sight it may not seem to have any direct connection with the actual conduct of the War, it is, nevertheless, a matter of extreme importance with reference to all the problems of reconstruction, and especially to our relationships with the peoples of other countries immediately the War is over. It will be my endeavour to make it clear that the policy of devolution has become a necessity in order that we may win the peace and ensure that the fruits of victory are safely held for the free democracies. No apology is therefore needed for entering into a discussion of this question at the present time. For in this, as in other matters, steps must be taken to put our house in order with the least possible delay. The repeated failures to settle the Irish controversy always gave the devolutionists an opportunity of bringing forward their case. The stock arguments were invariably the same the congestion of business in Parliament; the long delays in dealing with Public and Private Bill legisla- tion the inefficiency of the popular control which was supposed to be exercised over the great departments of State the need for decentralisation all round which, if applied impartially to England, Scotland and Wales, as well as to Ireland, would remove or mitigate the hostility of Ulster to a scheme of Home Rule. All these considera- tions have been urged over and over again, and I do not propose to deal with them at any length. Our experiences during the War have only served to increase the force of these arguments. It is quite clear that during the period of reconstruction, and for long afterwards, the legislative machine, as it is at present constituted, will not be able to keep abreast with the demands of public opinion. It must be speeded up, and the most expeditious way of doing this is to relieve Parliament of many of the domestic functions it exercises at present, and transfer these to local assemblies. The creation of new Government depart- ments, which have come into existence during the War, and the corresponding increase in the Ministry, together with the enlargement of the old Departments, has increased enormously the responsibility of Parliament for the sound and efficient administration of the public services. These were onerous enough in pre-war days. Now we live, move, and have our being under the most complete form of bureaucracy. Government officials control our every- day-life, and in a way undreamt of in time of peace. Everything and everybody is controlled; waste and overlapping are everywhere to be found, and this state of things the country will not tolerate when the War comes to an end. What is the remedy? How are we to rid ourselves of this incubus? How can the demobilisation of these departments be speeded up, and how can the transition period be bridged over without impairing the efficiency of the machine ? How is Parliament to be relieved of the impossible task of supervising and controlling the in- numerable activities of its host of public officials, who are supposed to be employed in the service of the State ? There is only one answer, and that answer is devolution. There is another aspect of this question which did not loom so large in pre-war days as it does to-day. If we succeed in securing a democratic peace, if we can impose our War aims upon the enemy, we have a right to expect that secret diplomacy will become a thing of the past and that the direction of our Foreign Policy will become a live issue in the country. Unless the lessons of the War are completely forgotten or ignored, the electors will insist upon shaping our foreign and colonial policy in accordance with their views. There is only one danger, and that is that their attention should be diverted entirely to the many urgent domestic questions by which they will be confronted and that extraneous problems of at least equal importance may be settled over their heads. We cannot afford to run the risk of confusing the issues. There must be a clear line of demarcation, and consequently there will have to be two sets of elections and two sets of candidates. This change can be brought about by the creation of local assemblies or parliaments to deal with all purely local affairs, whilst foreign and imperial matters are retained for the consideration and decision of the Imperial Parlia- ment. Only thus can democracy disentangle itself from the snares and pitfalls of the Party machines only thus can the considered opinions of the electorate find a clear and definite expression and only thus can we hope to enlist permanently the intelligent interest of the electorate in their relationship with the peoples of other countries. The future of the League of Nations, the issues of peace and war, the freedom of exchange of commodities, and other questions of high policy may all depend upon the freedom of the electors to give a clear and unqualified decision. Even in pre-war days the issues at elections were hopelessly confusing. Many people who might have supported the Foreign Policy of one party, were constrained to vote against it on account of some domestic issue in which they were still more keenly interested. What have education, public health, housing, temperance, industrial and other purely internal affairs to do with problems of Imperial Federation, with our relations with the peoples of India, with the establishment of an inter- national Court, with the structure of a League of Nations ? And yet as things are at present an elector who may desire to support a definite method of dealing with one or other of these latter questions may yet feel bound to vote against the candidate who adopts his programme because he dislikes his policy in regard to temperance or education. Again, many men's votes will be given for or against candidates who espouse the material interests of a certain section of the community. For instance, discharged and demobilised soldiers may produce a political pro-