Welsh Journals

Liberty as a Political Idea. By Sir Harry R. Reichel, M.A., LL. D. PART I. THE word Liberty is commonly used in two senses, and much I confusion of thought has arisen therefrom. It may mean personal liberty, the liberty of the individual citizen in relation to the State in which he lives. Again, it may mean national liberty or independence, the liberty of one State in relation to others. These two aspects of liberty are often found together, but often also apart. Thus Russia, under the Soviet Government, has national liberty or independence, but the individual Russian is virtually the slave of the State, exposed to arbitrary exaction, arbitrary imprisonment, and arbitrary execution, and deprived of all freedom of action. He has nothing he can call his own, and says what he thinks at his peril. India, on the other hand, has no independence, but the native Indian has a large measure of personal freedom. He can choose his own method of life, so far as social and religious custom allow him; he can be taxed only by law; in person and property he is protected from arbitrary inter- ference, whether of neighbours or of officials. A recent American historian has pointed out that the object of the great American Revolution was not, as is often supposed, personal liberty, which already existed, but national independence. It is in the former sense that I shall use the term this evening. Yet there is still danger of confusion. It is possible that "Liberty of the individual" may be used in more than one sense. "Many people," wrote Thring of Uppingham, the greatest British schoolmaster of the last half century, "mean by liberty the power to force other people to do what they themselves want them to do"; and here we come to the heart of the sub- ject. The desire for freedom to pursue one's own life and develop one's own activities is not only a natural instinct, but an essential condition of all progress. The man who lacks this lacks an essential element of full man- hood. But directly he begins to exercise this freedom, he finds himself up against the similar activities of his fellows. At every turn, he finds that he can only do what he wants to do by preventing someone else from exercising the same freedom. In any society absolute unfettered freedom of self-expression for any individual or group of individuals is only possible by denying all freedom to the rest of the community, that is, by reducing them to a state of slavery. The only case of a single individual enjoying such power is that of an absolute despot, as in old Turkey, and even there, except under the very greatest An address delivered to the Oxford Cambrian Society November 3rd, 1022. of the Sultans, absolute irresponsible liberty of action has always been in practice greatly circum- scribed by custom and personal influence. Thus, where there is no servitude, a clash of wills inevitably arises, which can only be settled by mutual agreement. The rules according to which the settlement is effected in individual cases we call Law, and the spirit which inspires these rules Justice. It follows that Law and Justice are an essential condition of Liberty in the true sense of the word. Nevertheless we find a common tendency, which seems on the increase, to regard Law and Justice as the enemies of Liberty. This is no doubt to be explained largely by the fact that laws, being made by fallible men, are apt to express not absolute justice, but an imperfect form of it. The most honest legislators cannot help being influenced, however unconsciously, by their own interests and prejudices, which generally reflect those of the class to which they belong. Thus an impression may be created that law is merely a device for ensuring the predominance of the legislators and their friends, that, in the words of Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic, "Justice is the interest of the stronger." All law- fetters, and those who have little or no share in shaping the laws as they stand, naturally feel themselves unduly fettered, and demand in the name of Liberty that these fetters should be struck off. Hence arises an apparently never-ending struggle between Liberty and Law, two principles which in the nature of things should be close allies. Every demand for a change in law, whether put forward by progressives or reaction- aries, is made in the name of Liberty. A good illustration of this is furnished by the proclama- tions of the two Pretenders in Thackeray's humorous satire, "The Next French Revolution," which contains some of the most delightful political fooling in the English language. The Bonapartist Pretender, John Thomas Napoleon, and the Legitimist, Henri V, put forward pro- grammes respectively of Imperial Militarism and extreme Clerical Reaction, each in the name of Liberty I. JOHN THOMAS NAPOLEON: "You have been promised Liberty, but you have none. I will endow you with the true, the real freedom. When your ancestors burst over the Alps, were they not free ? Yes Free to conquer Let us imitate the example of those indomitable myriads, once more trample over Europe, march in triumph into her prostrate capitals and bring her Kings with her treasures to our feet. This is the liberty worthy of Frenchmen. "Frenchmen! Up and rally! I have flung my banner to the breeze; 'tis surrounded by the faithful and the brave. Up, and let our motto be 'Liberty, Equality, War all over the World II. HENRI V "Our afflicted country cries aloud for reforms. The infamous Universities shall be abolished. Education shall no longer be permitted. A sacred and wholesome