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A Constructive Policy for Wales By T. P. Ellis. s37. r i HE development of the constitutional fabric, which we have noticed was co- ordinated by the genius of Hywel Dda into a complete structure, was prevented by a series of circumstances from endurance. The first was that, with the death of the great King himself, a fundamental error was made in applying to the succession to the kingship the rules regarding succession to property. The actual period during which Hywel Dda ruled as King of all Wales was too short to allow the principle of monarchical unity to establish itself for good and his immediate successors were not of the same ability as himself. The error was a departure from the theory of government laid down by the King himself, but it was due partly to the geographical characteristics of the land, and partly to the fact that, soon after, new forces began to operate. Nevertheless, the warning is there clear enough for us to-day, and it has been repeated time after time in our history; that is, that it is only by concentration on the principle of Welsh unity and the sinking of all sectional or personal interests, that the future of Wales can be secured. The importance of this error, however, we are in danger too often of exaggerating, for it could, and probably would, have been countered by the application of the principle of federation, through subordination to Aberffraw, had it not been for other forces. The new forces which operated were external to Wales in origin they were the coming of the Danes, and the coming of the Normans. The Danes had no theory of government at all they were solely and entirely freebooters, bent merely on destruction and loot. The Normans, who succeeded them, had a very definite theory of government, utterly alien to Welsh conceptions but before that theory could be put into operation, absolute and entire conquest was an essential preliminary. That conquest they achieved in England with consummate ease, in a matter of a few days, and they were so enabled to apply their theory there at once. In Wales the conquest occupied rather more than 200 years, and, when the 200 years had elapsed, the practice of their theory was already breaking down elsewhere, and was not applied to Wales. The direct result of the struggle against the Danes and against the Normans, while it was proceeding, had two marked effects. It intensified, firstly, the racial and geo- graphical distinctions already existing, and secondly, the actual administration of Wales passed, as it was bound to pass, into the hands of those who could wield the sword, and away from the hands of men who were primarily statesmen like Hywel Dda. The period was a struggle for existence of the sternest and most long-drawn out character. The consequence was that, at first, a series of strong military adventurers like Bleddyn ap Cynfan, Llywelyn ap Seisyllt, Gruffydd ap Llywelyn, and Trahaearn ap Caradawg came to the front. They were what may be reasonably called usurpers, whose existence, nevertheless, was justified by the necessity of defending the land against aggression. When, however, the legitimate houses of north and south produced, in the persons of Gruffydd ap Cynan and Rhys ap Tewder, men of equal military capacity, there seemed once more a chance of unity. That unity was prevented, partly by the fact that the descendants of some of the usurpers pressed their new claims, and re- fused to submit, partly by the gradual absorption of the south and attempts upon the north by the Norman power. The unity could not be achieved because the sword, in the hands of Norman and Welsh alike, had become the de- finite arbiter of the fortunes of Wales. Great figures, some of them men of statesman- like capacity, appeared in this period-Gruffydd ap Cynan, Owain Gwynedd, Llywelyn Fawr, Arglwydd Rhys, and Llywelyn ap Gruffydd but the ultimate result was the more marked division of Wales into Gwynedd, Powys and Deneubarth, with the abandonment of the theory of federation on the one hand and the slow advance of the Norman-Angevins on the other, culminating in the final defeat of 1284. I do not propose to deal with the political, statesmanlike outlook of these great military figures. They had, especially men like Llywelyn Fawr and Arglwydd Rhys, very definite ideas of government, a very definite policy of consolida- tion and unification, a clear-cut idea regarding the development of indigenous law and institu- tions, which, for a time, they were able to give effect to, creating the most prosperous period, that of Llywelyn Fawr, of early Welsh history but the outstanding feature of the time was the need of defence, to which everything else had to be subordinated. It was because that defence against over- whelming forces ultimately failed that the political edifice of Hywel Dda's clays was pre- vented from becoming translated into permanent fact. That is to say, the breakdown of the political development of Wales on indigenous lines was due, not to any inherent defect in itself, but to outside aggression. Let us glance, very briefly, at what was the meaning of that great struggle, apart from the feature which seems the most apparent one, that of conquest by the Norman-Angevin to secure a consolidated realm on the one hand and that of defence on the other.